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T R O T T E R  R E V I E W
The Somali Diaspora  
in Greater Boston
Paul R. Camacho, Abdi Dirshe, Mohamoud Hiray, 
and Mohamed J. Farah 
East Africans as America’s Newest Immigrants
 Our nation was founded on and thrives on immigration. One 
of the newest immigrant groups in the Boston area are Somalis. They 
are among the largest of the new populations of African immigrants. 
While precise numbers are very difficult to determine, there are 
approximately 8,000 in the Greater Boston area and another 2,000 
estimated across the rest of Massachusetts. Very few studies have 
examined Somalis in the United States, and no studies exist on the 
community in Boston or Massachusetts. 
 It is an interesting sociological question to ask how similar the  
Somali experience has been in the United States (and in Boston) com-
pared with other immigrant groups. In this article, we will attempt to 
suggest some plausible answers to that question, but a definitive answer 
awaits a formal research study.
 Turmoil, poverty, and war—particularly civil war—are powerful 
motivating factors in the migration of large numbers of people away 
from their cultural roots. These circumstances have certainly been 
present in the case of the failed state of Somalia. Prior to the outbreak 
of civil war in 1991, the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, was actually a 
tourist destination. But since then Somalia in general and the capital 
of Mogadishu have come to represent one of the worst cases in nation 
state failure and chaos in civil war.
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Supporting Enterprise, Culturally
Saido Farah (left) and Deeqo Jibril pause before stocked shelves in a Somali-owned 
store, Farah’s Roots Halal Meat Market in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of  
Boston. Islam’s ban on interest-bearing loans creates financial challenges for 
Somali immigrants who open small businesses. Photo by Talia Whyte/Inter Press 
Service (IPS). Reprinted by permission.
Arrival in the Diaspora
 The trickle of Somalis who came to the United States during the 
1970s and 1980s were oriented toward acquiring professional training 
and/or pursuing small business opportunities of the kind that many 
ethnic immigrant families run: grocery stores, butcher shops, clothing 
stores, convenience stores, or restaurants. The large stream of refugees 
began soon after militia armies defeated government forces in 1991. 
Comparatively speaking, these emigrations involved huge numbers—
literally thousands—fleeing the chaos.
 From the late 1990s to present, the young Somali immigrant 
population has mirrored other segments of the youth population in 
the United States, with a number of individuals pursuing opportuni-
ties in higher education, professional development, and small busi-
ness, while others are not succeeding and are in danger of succumbing 
to personal disinvestment in their new country. Those who fail to latch 
onto socioeconomic opportunity are likely to see their energies chan-
neled toward lower-paying jobs in the service sector—or worse.
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 Since 1998, many of those in the first and second waves of Somali 
immigrants, who have been educated in the United States, are actu-
ally now looking for jobs overseas, where their training will ensure a 
relatively higher standard of living. Kenya and the Middle East are major 
destinations because Somalis constitute a sizable segment of the busi-
ness sector in those areas. A number of Somali-American professionals 
from Boston area have found jobs and settled with their families in the 
Middle East (primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates).
Authors’ Subset and Modification of Table 52, Population by Selected 
Ancestry Group and Region: 2006
Ancestry Number





Cape Verdean 88,420 3.5% 9.2%
Ethiopian 151,491 6.0% 15.8%
Ghanaian 79,510 3.1% 8.3%
Kenyan 37,795 1.5% 3.9%
Liberian 44,873 1.8% 4.7%
Nigerian 237,527 9.3% 24.8%
Senegalese 10,341 0.4% 1.1%
Sierra Leonean 14,365 0.6% 1.5%
Somali 91,016 3.6% 9.5%
South African 53,974 2.1% 5.6%
Sudanese 40,261 1.6% 4.2%
Ugandan 5,058 0.2% 0.5%













Total & Pct. Total 2,547,453 100%
See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, National Data 




 Accurate data on the Somali population worldwide is only avail-
able in fragments. Figures vary widely and are virtually always underes-
timated. Since 2000, the Diaspora’s population has multiplied manyfold 
and is thought to represent some 14 percent of the Somali population. 
This has prompted the latest UN-sponsored report to call the Somali 
population a truly global population.1  For example, Somalis are the larg-
est non-European ethnic minority in Finland, with a community of 9,000.
 There has been a huge influx of individuals into the United States 
and Canada since 2000. UN data indicate that there were only 25,000 
Somalis in the United States and 30,000 in Canada in 2000. North Ameri-
can activists from the Somali community have estimated that there are 
as many as 150,000 Somalis in the United States and another 150,000 in 
Canada. These activist estimates are anecdotal in that they are based on 
the community’s general awareness of their numbers who receive state 
or local governmental services, the number of (Somali) children in vari-
ous schools, community self-help organizations’ estimates of their client 
base, and so forth. Those figures for both countries may be high. Census 
Bureau information from the 2009 Statistical Abstract National Data 
Book indicates that there were (as of 2006) some 91,000 Somalis in the 
United States. The 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates 
indicate that there were 120,102 with a margin of error of +/- 10,979,2  
representing roughly 3.6 percent of all African refugees or immigrants 
and 9.5 percent of all sub-Saharan Africans in the nation.3 The Canadian 
government’s National Household Survey places the Somali immigrant 
population at only 44, 995.4  Further, although this particular survey was 
voluntary and only 20 percent of households were contacted, the 2006 
census indicated there were only 37,790 of Somali heritage.5 Currently it 
is thought that some 14 percent of the Somali population, or one million 
people, live in the Diaspora worldwide.6 
 Depending on the estimate, Somalis are arguably the third 
largest sub-Saharan African group in the United States, after Nigeri-
ans and Ethiopians, and they outnumber Cape Verdeans, who started 
immigrating during the 19th century. Further, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that Somali immigrants are having large families ( four to six 
children), and thus the Somali-American population can be expected 
to grow substantially over the next few decades.
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 In Canada, Toronto has the greatest population of Somali 
residents. That number, however, has been declining as more Somalis 
seek opportunities in the better economies of western Canada.  In the 
United States, Minneapolis is home to approximately 60,000 Somali-
Americans and refugees. Other American cities have lesser popula-
tions: Columbus, Ohio, 30,000; Atlanta, 15,000; and Seattle, 10,000.
 Approximately 28 percent of the people now residing in Boston 
were born in another country.7  In Massachusetts there are about 
10,000 Somalis, with roughly 8,000 residing in Boston. Roxbury and 
Charlestown are home to the largest concentrations, with smaller 
communities in Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, and East Boston. 
 The civil war surged, abated, and surged again in seemingly end-
less iterations across Somalia. This necessitated the separation of fam-
ily members into different safe zones within Somalia and neighboring 
nations, and other parts of the globe, through emigration. As they 
settled in new nations, these immigrants have sought to reestablish 
relations with nuclear and extended family members who left prior or 















United Arab Emirates 25,000




subsequent to their own departure. As a result, Somalis in one nation 
have contacts with family or friends around the world.
The Terrorist Concern 
 Despite the many negative articles in mainstream media focusing 
on the population of extreme Islamic militants known as Al-Shabaab 
and the anxious concerns of various agencies about perhaps two-dozen 
Somali youth who returned to Somalia in the last few years, there are 
a number of distinct signs of a growing process of “Americanization.”8  
There is no case of a Somali-American who has traveled outside the  
United States returning and engaging in politically or religiously moti-
vated violence. Yet, concerns escalated when the Islamic Courts Union 
came to power in Mogadishu in 2006. In turn, this development led 
to the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, which the Somali community 
viewed as an American-sponsored or -sanctioned effort. With the rise 
of Al-Shabaab and its call to Muslims to wage jihad in Somalia, several 
young Somalis heeded the call, committing suicide bombings in their  
nation. In October 2011, the New York Times reported that a Somali-
American was identified as the bomber in an attack that killed several 
African peacekeepers in Mogadishu and that as many as 20 young  
Three Consequences of Terror and U.S. Policy for the Somali Community
■ U.S. support for the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia was opposed by the 
Somali American population and was a critical factor in creating a relatively unified 
Somali American, Somali Canadian front for political action to change U.S. policy. 
Prior to the Ethiopian invasion, this level of unity would not have been possible. 
With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, the continuation of these North Ameri-
can alliances is uncertain. 
■ The intelligence community’s reaction to these events has been intimidating at 
ports of entry, and Somali Americans have a certain dread of the questioning 
they will almost surely undergo. U.S. agents have visited a number of Somali 
Americans in connection with the global war on terror. The apprehension cre-
ated has fostered an atmosphere that allows stereotyping and discrimination to 
develop in various communities across the nation and made new Somali 
immigrants suspicious of seeking assistance. There are no ombudsman-type 
functionaries who can address individual and community issues on their behalf. 
There are few outlets for the community’s anxiety and frustration.
■ Finally, there are a number of less-than-credible leaders or leaders with narrow 
followings who have presented themselves to the media and political figures as 
spokespersons for the wider community.
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Somali men had left the United States to join Al-Shabaab.9 Subsequently, 
many Somalis in the United States and Canada reported undue scru-
tiny from the authorities and media as Somalis came to be profiled 
at airports and at U.S.-Canada border crossings. Despite this uneasy 
relationship, many Somali Americans continue to visit Somalia and 
return home, engaging in no religious or political violence. Media reports 
usually focus on those involved in the terrorist actions in Somalia and do 
not cover those Somalis returning from vacation or family visits. Many 
Somali Americans (and respectively, Somali Canadians) viewed this 
unbalanced focus as an attack on the Somali community in general and 
as a reinforcement of negative stereotyping. 
Similarities and Dissimilarities to Other Immigrant Experiences
Similarities
 How does the Somali community compare with the ethnic-racial 
immigrant communities of the past? A reasonable comparison could 
be to look at the experiences of those who came to the United States as 
a result of wars and those who came as ordinary African immigrants. 
This analysis provides a rich context because the experiences some-
times converge in terms of education, employment, barriers, and other 
systemic problems, but diverge in other ways. Certainly it can be argued 
that those fleeing from wars are more vulnerable and mostly unpre-
pared for their new environments. They have psychological issues that 
other immigrants may not have. Access to psychological services is 
nonexistent because the immigration system was created to deal with 
other social and economic issues. The younger Somalis who are born 
in the United States are also dealing with unique issues, unlike other 
immigrants, because of the psychological experiences and economic 
and social conditions of their parents. Many face isolation and lack of 
education and are totally unprepared for the new environment.  
 One similarity is the issue of gradual socio-cultural gap growing 
between both the older and younger generations and the degree to which 
each identifies with the “old country.” Many who arrived here extremely 
young or who have been born here have little knowledge or feeling about 
the clan strife that has afflicted Somalia for the past two decades. They 
correspondingly have less of an emotional connection with Somalia. Also, 
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as with other ethnic-racial immigrants, the worldview of the younger 
generation is not always in line with that of the older generation, both 
in terms of allegiance to the homeland and life in America. There is, in 
short, a growing socio-cultural gap between the Somali generations in 
the United States. Whether this gap is being more intensely experienced 
by the Somali community than in previous immigrant communities is 
difficult to say. In many cases, the salience of the affiliation to Somalia is 
based on where they live and their awareness of a particular group that 
emphasizes ties to the old country. In a sense, Somali-American youth are 
living two lives—one in their homeland and another on Main Street.
 Another obvious difficulty common to all new refugee-immigrant 
populations has been language barriers and limited awareness of how 
to access even the most basic community services. That problem has 
not accompanied the Somalis’ arrival. As with the European immigrants 
of many decades past and the new arrivals from Vietnam in the 1980s 
or Central and South Americans more recently, the younger members of 
the community adapt more quickly to the new environment in terms of 
both language and culture. Consequently, this faster adaptation in turn 
begets a generational status problem because the young often become 
intermediaries for their elders. For example, it is the younger family 
members who, in many cases, speak English better and have more read-
ily adapted to the new host country and thus intercede with various 
agencies on behalf of the family. This role can create embarrassment for 
elders and a strain on family relationships as the parent-child hierarchy 
is reversed, even if only temporarily.
 Further, as with other new arrivals, there comes a point when 
the members of the immigrant-refugee community feel collective 
anxiety about their cultural heritage.10 In terms of timeline, it often 
occurs between the generations of the initial arrivals and those born 
in the United States. Again, it is the young who quickly adapt to the 
new culture; for their elders, it is often all too quick. In this case, we  
include in that first generation not only those born here, but also those 
who arrived as very young children. In the Somali case, there are the 
added pressures of the Somali language having been exclusively oral 
until the early 1970s and the 30 years of conflict and living in the Dias-
pora that have eroded ethnic and extended family ties. Here in Boston, 
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the African Community Economic Development of New England has 
responded to these concerns by developing a Somali language class 
that have taught approximately 80 students.11 
 Another similarity with other immigrant groups is the practice 
of sending remittances back to “the old country.” Vietnamese refu-
gees, for instance, have certainly provided support for families back in 
Vietnam. From 1991 to 2005, the Vietnamese Diaspora sent $15 billion 
to Vietnam.12  Yet, only a few years after the war, Vietnam had basically 
stabilized. Unfortunately, Somalia is still in turmoil, a fact that makes 
remittances even more crucial. According to the World Bank, recent 
research documents that remittances to Somalia (which came to at least 
$1 billion in 2006) constitute 23 percent of the income in urban Somali 
households, such as those located in Hargeisa, with some 40 percent of 
all households receiving assistance. A substantial segment of this money 
is channeled into educational opportunities for Somali children.13
Differences
 Certainly the most significant difference in Somali immigrants 
is the religio-cultural. Nearly 100 percent of Somalis are Muslims. There 
are approximately 28 mosques or centers that host Islamic services in 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. At least eight of the 
mosques are located in the city of Boston: Yusuf Mosque on Chestnut Hill 
Avenue in Brighton; Mosque for the Praising of Allah on Shawmut Avenue 
in Roxbury; Masjid Al-Quran on Intervale Street, Dorchester; Muham-
mad’s Mosque #11 on Washington Street, Dorchester; Masjid Al-Noor on 
Circuit Street, Roxbury; Allston Brighton Islamic Center on North Beacon 
Street, Allston; and Masjid Al-Taqwa on Washington Street in Jamaica 
Plain.14  Only the last one, Masjid Al-Taqwa, serves the Somali community 
exclusively. Some of the mosques provide schooling for children over the 
weekend, with lessons in Koran memorization and religious lectures. 
Finally, there is the new and very impressive Islamic Society of Boston 
Cultural Center on Malcolm X Boulevard in Roxbury Crossing. This is the 
primary location of events for the greater Islamic community.
 The composition of the Islamic service is different from a Chris-
tian Protestant service or a Catholic mass. An Islamic service includes 
the muhadara, which is often a lecture about social issues. The subject 
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can be almost anything: marriage, politics, the news of the week, or 
important current issues. These events are scheduled and announced 
by the mosque administration and open to everyone. The service also 
includes the Friday prayer or qudba (a speech before the prayer). The 
sequence usually has the speech first and the prayer last.
 Also, the relationship of the religion to the individual is much 
more of a community tie that does not quite translate into the progres-
sive urban American environment. Ironically, perhaps its closest approxi-
mation may be found in the rural Christian communities of the Bible 
Belt, where the first question asked of a newcomer is not “What do you 
do?” (i.e., job or profession), but rather, “What church do you belong to?” 
This similarity is ironic, because it is from these conservative Christian 
communities that a great deal of fear of immigration is generated. Mus-
lims can go to any mosque for prayer, but they usually go to the mosque 
closest to them or the one where they can socialize more. This choice is 
mostly nation-oriented. If you are Pakistani, you will mostly likely attend 
services where most Pakistanis do. One other important distinction for 
Muslims is whether a person is a Sunni Muslim or Shia Muslim; this dif-
ference in sect can also determine which mosque one goes to.  
 In addition to religion, some of the cultural normative differences 
are perhaps worth noting, for it is often in work-a-day behaviors that 
perceptions and misperceptions are created. In the Somali community, 
normative behavior is to use the right hand for greeting and serving. The 
left hand is considered “the lesser.” Also, traditionally members of the 
opposite sex do not shake hands or hold hands in public. Depending on 
the proximity to religious conservatism, women wear a rather distinct 
“jilbab” (a more colorful hijab), with married women and single women 
also differing in style of dress or head covering. Single Somali women 
are more likely to be less stringent in covering up (the full dress) unless 
they are very conservative. Whether one wears the full dress style or 
simply a head covering is a personal choice and is not specifically con-
nected to whether a woman is single or married.
 The current state of conflict, ongoing since the end of the Cold War, 
has no doubt fueled the culture-gap fear that lies underneath the surface 
for the new Islamic immigrants and host communities in the United 
States. The conclusion of the Cold War ushered in the end of bipolar 
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sponsorship and demands by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund for economic structural adjustments and international corporate 
investments, which in turn were followed by political turmoil, ungoverned 
areas, and a power vacuum in which chaos, war, and terror gained ground. 
Much of this pattern has played out in Africa and in the Islamic global 
sphere since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Political scientist Samuel Huntington has labeled the state of affairs as the 
“clash of civilizations.” For the most part, a fear-driven process has stirred 
up a variety of cultural concoctions of stereotyped positions.15
Pertinent Issues for the Community
Employment, Small Business Participation
 Somalis own perhaps two dozen small businesses in Boston, with 
the majority located in minority communities. On Harrison Avenue in 
Roxbury, one mini-mall alone has approximately eight businesses oper-
ated by Somali women. Women are prominent in all forms of local  
Somali enterprise, a rather crucial difference from other immigrant 
communities. Other small business endeavors include restaurants, 
coffee shops, dress and fabric shops, and convenience stores. Many of 
these, such as the Butterfly Café, are located in the vicinity of the new 
mosque on Malcolm X Boulevard. While the market focus of these 
endeavors is on the Somali and general Islamic community via spe-
cialty items not found elsewhere, there are signs of their appeal spilling 
over into other communities. One Somali convenience store also offers 
Latino food specialties. The fabric and dress shops show signs of endur-
ance, because their clothing items and accessories are virtually unique. 
As one owner put it, “When they buy an item here, they know that they 
will not come across another woman wearing the same thing.”
 Financial issues for Somalis, and no doubt many new Muslim 
immigrants as well, are credit and interest. Islam forbids interest. Yet, in 
American society, credit and the interest that go with it are practically 
omnipresent. The alternative for most Muslims in the United States is to 
use a credit card but pay off the balance each month. This practice also 
means that Muslim-owned businesses have to have significantly larger 
cash reserves available, money often acquired through family and fam-
ily connections. This mutual dependence leads to the hypothesis that 
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networking is perhaps more essential in Somali and Islamic immi-
grant communities than among Americans in general. Yet, the fact is 
that many Somalis have obtained loans, go into debt, own homes, or use 
credit cards. The conservative Muslims typically advocate against inter-
est-carrying loans. This counsel is mostly ignored due to the reality of life 
in the United States, the West, and the ever-more-globalized economy.
 The Somali professional community in Boston is still quite a fledg-
ling sector, but its members do have a kind of informal association, with 
occasional get-togethers. Nationally, there are Somali lawyers, dentists, 
teachers, and police—but none in Boston as of yet. A few young profes-
sionals and engineers, however, are working for such large companies as 
Raytheon, National Grid, State Street, Fidelity Investments, and major 
hospitals in Boston. Also, they have yet to develop a strong presence in the 
traditional blue-collar trades, such as masonry, roofing, carpentry, joinery, 
framing, sheetrock/plaster work, painting, sheet metal work, electrical 
wiring, and plumbing. More detailed occupational data on this growing 
community simply do not exist. Most recently, in Boston new professional 
networking groups have formed, such as the New England Somali Young 
Professionals & Students. This group aims to connect local young Somalis 
living in the New England area so that they may share resources, promote 
events, and occasionally get together to organize events.
Education
 The best numbers on the Somali presence in higher education 
in Massachusetts that the authors could estimate are as follows. There 
are approximately 100 Somali students at the University of Massachu-
setts Boston, perhaps another 100 at Bunker Hill Community College, 
50 at Roxbury Community College, and smaller numbers dispersed 
across the state. Somali students have struggled as they have tried to 
assimilate into the culture of American higher education. Many face 
a new language, culture, and way of learning. For example, although 
more than 20 new students enroll at Bunker Hill Community College 
each semester, only small percentage remain the following semester.
 Some 90 percent of the new Somali students enroll in college 
preparatory classes in high school; yet, they struggle as they face  
other personal challenges. When asked, they often attribute poor  
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performance to the lack of assistance at home because their parents 
are unable to speak English. Somali students also frequently have to 
work in order to support themselves and often support their families 
as well. With parents who only speak Somali, many Somali students 
must speak their native language at home and English in virtually  
all other settings. Advocates indicate that there are few resources 
that could fill the gap and provide support, enabling students to 
thrive academically.
 Higher education is only a small piece of the educational pic-
ture. A federal investigation determined that there was discrimination 
in school assignments for young immigrant students and in English 
language classes for the older generation. The older generation is most 
often lost between the cracks when it comes to the availability and 
cost of English language classes.16 
 This situation raises the question of the cost benefit of urban edu-
cational investment in Boston and Massachusetts. Boston has launched a 
number of programs, such as the Newcomers Academy on Maxwell Street 
in Dorchester, which is part of Boston International High School for stu-
dents new to the United States, who have limited English-speaking skills 
and whose education was interrupted in their nation of origin, impairing 
their academic progress.17 These efforts were apparently undertaken in 
response to a 2010 federal lawsuit in which investigators concluded that 
the Boston public school system was violating the rights of limited English 
speakers by failing to implement specialized education. The efforts are 
investments that will pay dividends in the future. Subsequently, the Black 
Educators Alliance of Massachusetts and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights under Law of the Boston Bar Association have filed suit over the 
system’s school merger plans and its impact on students of color.18
 By comparison, in Canada, governments at every level are seeking 
ways to improve services for newcomers. It is, however, the community 
that organizes itself and delivers services to the community. The govern-
ment service design looks great on paper, but delivery is ineffective due to 
poor leadership and lack of outreach to the community. Services designed 
and implemented from above often fail to reach down to the local level.
 At the elementary school level in Boston, the issue of school  
assignments was brought up during a meeting with a dozen members of 
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the Somali community. The Somalis in attendance pointed out that the 
school system had a practice of automatically assigning Somali children to 
particular schools, regardless of where they lived and whether the children 
had a language issue or not. (This practice was not an actual policy, but it 
was based on a perception that because the children were foreign born, 
they must take English as a second language classes or special education 
classes, without any assessment.) The perception-driven decisions behind 
these assignments affected all new minority communities, not just Soma-
lis. After a study documented this practice as a failure, the Office of the 
Mayor of Boston subsequently initiated another study of the issue. 
 At the secondary and higher education levels, Somali youth who 
spoke with the authors of this article felt a bit adrift and expressed 
the need for mentors or counselors who could help them navigate 
through their uncertainty; they also articulated a vague wish for a kind 
of community-based learning project that could provide them with a 
sense of focus.19 These uncertain feelings could be the reason why the 
school dropout rate is high among many new refugee immigrant popula-
tions. Upon arrival, many school-age children in Boston are assigned to 
schools or a grade level based on their age (particularly if the student has 
no transcripts), not based on their academic background. Many Somalis 
had no formal education while in refugee camps. Thus, they are assigned 
to their “age grade,” but their skills may be at a much lower level.
Health Care
 One of the problems confounding the delivery of health care is 
the cultural reservations that many Somali women have about sharing 
the information that providers seek. For conservative women from 
Islamic cultures in general and Somali women in particular, even 
being asked certain questions is embarrassing, and the older the 
respondent the more embarrassment they feel. One study indicates 
that of Somali women over the age of 40, only 68 percent have had a 
mammogram, and only 35 percent have ever performed a self-exam.20 
In addition, the phrasing of a question can create a defensive “looking 
glass” reaction. For example, one woman interviewed indicated that a 
common question asked by a nurse or doctor—“What brings you here 
today?”—is considered insulting. The woman reasons that “obviously 
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I am ill, or else why would I be here?” So offense is taken because the 
patient worries that the doctor or nurse is implying that she is  
not actually ill. The same interviewee indicated that rephrasing the 
question to “What illness troubles you today?” would make a remark-
able difference.
 Although data are not readily available, it is felt that within the 
Somali community, as with other refugee communities, that there is a 
significant prevalence of anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
These mental health issues are particularly acute since nearly all fami-
lies in the Diaspora are separated. Medical professionals may need 
more nuanced kinds of assessment tools when initially interviewing 
new patients from refugee populations.
Housing and Home Ownership
 A number of Somali families are or have been homeless and 
have stayed in a shelter. Some 90 percent of the Somali community 
lives in some form of subsidized housing, either from the Boston 
Housing Authority or under a federal Section 8 voucher. They share 
that housing situation, despite the different arrival status of the two 
major groups of Somalis in Boston: those who came before the start 
of the warlord wars and those who have come since then. The former 
arrived as students or under some other immigration category. Those 
who came after 1993 have predominately done so as refugees. 
 There is probably a very low home ownership rate, because few 
have financial security. Religio-cultural issues come into play as well. 
On one hand, the notion of interest is anathema for many Islamic 
faithful. The culturally acceptable way is to have the funds to make the 
purchase of anything immediate and final with cash. The Somali cul-
ture (with the exception of the Somali-Bantu population) is a nomadic 
culture; thus, the notion of particular and permanent roots is some-
what outside the norm. When ownership of housing is accomplished, 
it is often done so by way of a number of loan configurations consid-
ered Sharia-compliant. Sharia is custom, incorporating the writings 
of a number of clerics and referring to something that is legal accord-
ing to Islam. There is a school of thought that rejects any interest  
on money loaned, a viewpoint that leads to two alternatives: buy  
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everything in cash or find an individual who offers the same  
amount of money but calls the cost of borrowing something other 
than interest. 
Community Agency and Organizational Capacity
 One indicator of immigrant acclimation is the presence, vitality, 
and capacity of its community-based organizations and agencies. These 
are reservoirs of social capital for families and individuals. Currently, 
there are three Somali community agencies in Boston: African Commu-
nity Economic Development of New England in Roxbury, Somali Devel-
opment Center in Jamaica Plain, and Refugee and Immigrant Assistance 
Center, also in Jamaica Plain. These agencies focus on specific areas, but 
as with other nascent immigrant communities, they have to respond 
to needs to be viable for the community. Their programs and program 
development and maintenance are demand driven. Budgets are slim, 
and there is competition for resources. Therefore, the financial health of 
these organizations is difficult to assess.
 There is little evidence of alliances between Somali Americans 
and other African immigrant communities in Boston. There is little to 
bring them together, particularly when the leadership of each is basi-
cally in the hands of elders, who tend to identify with customs in the 
homeland rather than current needs in their present communities. 
Thus, indifference or conflict operates more than cooperation. In the 
last decade and more recently, the Boston community has seen the 
development of community groups to address this situation. The Mus-
lim American Society of Boston was established in 1999. Since that 
time, numerous other groups have been organized, specifically the  
Islamic Society of Boston and various national communities or stu-
dent groups. Various websites provide listings of these organizations.21
 From a community development perspective, young Somali 
American professionals and local university students should engage 
and volunteer with local Somali community agencies to help build their 
capacity, enabling them to develop more robust programs that will ben-
efit the Massachusetts Somali community at large and, in particular, its 
youth. For instance, the agencies could develop key performance indica-
tors or benchmarks for programs that reduce school dropout rates or 
115
youth violence, or programs that address family health, literacy, English 
language learning, and job placement assistance. 
 For this collaboration between young talents and local community 
agencies to succeed, the agencies should be more transparent about how 
they operate, including the level of funding or grants that they have  
received from the state and federal governments or other donors on 
behalf of the Somali community. More important, these agencies should 
allow the young talents to become board members, rather than select-
ing family members or close associates to sit on the boards. These young 
Somalis are knowledgeable and likely to scrutinize youth programs  
and suggest new ideas that can realign resources for better service to  
the community.
Conclusion
 The experiences of the Somali community and, to a consider-
able extent, other new African immigrant communities are both 
disparate yet similar to those of previous immigrant groups. They are 
disparate in terms of language, religion, and race when compared to 
the Eurocentric immigrant communities of a hundred years ago, yet 
similar in their experiences of intergenerational conflict between the 
elders and the youth, and in terms of being isolated and experiencing 
discrimination. Like many of the newcomers of the past, they have 
educational and skill deficiencies and see few entry opportunities into 
the more skilled blue-collar trades. Also, like other European immi-
grant groups of the 1950s, their community-based organizations are 
often limited in capacity and reluctant to cooperate with each other 
and the other African immigrant organizations in the city.
 The greatest problem in constructing an accurate picture of the 
Somali community in Massachusetts, the entire country, and Canada, 
is the lack of data, despite the fact that several studies have been con-
ducted.22 Census studies have failed to capture much information that 
can shed light on the various new East African immigrant communi-
ties, of which the Somali community is the second largest, after the 
Ethiopian immigrants. One possible way to surmount this difficulty is 
to organize and develop a citywide census project that attempts to  
get better population data and identify local businesses owned and 
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operated by these new African immigrant communities. Another 
would be to develop a community-based organization that would 
specifically focus on addressing the issues and needs of the new  
immigrant youth.
 The biggest consideration going forward is the future of the Somali 
youth. They are virtually at a crossroads. It is uncertain whether they will 
remain attached to the older generation and, more important, whether 
they will seek conventional means by which to achieve economic and 
social advancement and secure their place in a productive social life or 
fall into criminal activity. The community is seeking ways to inspire the 
young people to pursue education. To an extent, the younger generation 
is far less interested in fighting the old wars in the homeland and much 
more oriented to gaining their slice of the American dream. In part, their 
degree of interest in the old homeland versus the new will be determined 
by their economic and political success, as well as by their cultural 
integration. It is going to be difficult to determine their level of success 
without some kind of a baseline study of the Somali community that can 
provide extensive data on a number of socioeconomic indicators. Those 
indicators would include growth in the professional and political sectors, 
such as lawyers, doctors, state legislators, economists, and teachers. 
 While opinions can vary about the tipping point for indices of 
success, one might suggest that representation in Congress is a power-
ful indicator of arrival. For example, only a few years ago the Vietnamese 
community gained such a distinction—Republican immigration attorney 
Anh “Joseph” Cao from Louisiana. In 2007, Keith Ellison of Minnesota 
became the first member of Congress of the Islamic faith. The authors 
of this article look forward to the arrival of the first Somali American in 
Congress. That would serve as a solid benchmark.
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